Steven J. Topazio - Attorney At Law

The defendant, who resides in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, was visiting Massachusetts for a convention and received a criminal citation after getting lost at Logan International Airport trying to find the Ted Williams Tunnel, hired Attorney Topazio after receiving a summons to appear in court. The client informed Attorney Topazio that due to extenuating circumstances, she preferred not to return to Massachusetts and wanted him to waive her presence in court and to resolve her case in her absence. According to the Criminal Rules of Procedure, Rule 7(b), Attorney Topazio filed his appearance in court, advanced his client's case and waived her appearance at her arraignment. Attorney Topazio represented to the court that he had his client's authority to resolve her case in her absence, provided the court would allow; which it did. After conferencing the case with the District Attorney and the judge, Attorney Topazio caused his client to be found not responsible on both the civil infractions and represented to court, that if the remaining criminal charge were dismissed, that his client would pay $150.00 in court costs in lieu of returning to Massachusetts to fight the charge; and the court agreed. Today, Attorney Topazio convinced the court, with the District Attorney's consent, to give his client until December 30, 2009 to pay $150.00 before dismissing the case.

The defendant was charged with Possession of Class B, two counts of ABPO and resisting arrest, when he was found to be in possession of aspirin which the police believed to be cocaine. Despite Attorney Topazio arguing that the substance that was found was aspirin, his client who was in custody on a probation detainer on a different case and bail on this case, decided to tender a plea. The Commonwealth argued that the substance found, on visual inspection, appeared to be cocaine and would not dismiss that charge. Attorney Topazio requested that as a condition of the original plea wanted the court to order the Commonwealth to provide him with a copy of the drug certification and to reconsider the sentence should the drugs test negative, which they subsequently did. Today, after the Commonwealth dismissed the drug charge, on the oral motion to reconsider argued by Attorney Topazio, Attorney Topazio tried to convert his client's sentence (which was a split sentence with 3 years supervised probation including the requirement of completing the Office of Community Corrections Level III program) into a time served sentence on the remaining counts, but that did not happen. Instead Attorney Topazio persuaded the court to strike the condition that his client complete OCC Level III and further caused the court to switch his client's probation form supervised to unsupervised. Community Corrections Centers are community based, intensive supervision sites, which deliver bundled sanctions and services, including treatment and education, to high risk offenders via Intermediate Sanction Levels. Intermediate Sanction Level III is an intense level of community-based, criminal justice supervision. Sanctions and services required at this level of supervision represent a daily imposition upon the liberty of the offender. Level III participants are required to report to the community corrections center for one to four hours per day, three to five days per week. Offenders placed at Intermediate Sanction Level III may be monitored via electronic device. Level III also requires random drug and alcohol testing, and attendance at one four hour community service shift per week.

The defendant who had pled guilty on October 5, 2009 to aggravated assault and battery as a result of causing a large laceration to his girlfriend's head, received a suspended sentence with the condition, among other things, of attending Level III of the Office of Community Corrections. In the early 1990's the Commonwealth commenced a systemic effort to provide for more effective and efficient criminal justice sentencing and specifically address prison overcrowding. As a result, the Office of Community Corrections was established in 1996 by virtue of Massachusetts General Law chapter 211F. The Office of Community Corrections is a division of the Office of the Commissioner of Probation. Community Corrections Centers are community based, intensive supervision sites, which deliver bundled sanctions and services, including treatment and education, to high risk offenders via Intermediate Sanction Levels. Intermediate Sanction Level III is an intense level of community-based, criminal justice supervision. Sanctions and services required at this level of supervision represent a daily imposition upon the liberty of the offender. Level III participants are required to report to the community corrections center for one to four hours per day, three to five days per week. Offenders placed at Intermediate Sanction Level III may be monitored via electronic device. Level III also requires random drug and alcohol testing, and attendance at one four hour community service shift per week. After refusing to attend Level III of the Office of Community Corrections, the defendant received a Notice of Probation Violation from his probation officer, sought assistance from Attorney Topazio. Attorney Topazio initially convinced the court not to hold his client on a probation detainer, arguing that a series of recent events rendered his client homeless and thus incapable of complying with the terms of his probation. Attorney Topazio met with the supervising probation officer and the chief probation officer and convinced them to modify the terms of the sentence if his client entered an inpatient residential program. Today, in order to avoid a final probation hearing, Attorney Topazio filed a Motion to Revise and Revoke the original sentence asking the Court to strike the requirement that his client complete OCC Level III and instead to complete an inpatient ½ way house program, and the court agreed.

The defendant, a professional person and recovering addict, was accused of presenting a forged prescription for the prescription medication Dilaudid which was in the name of a third party, who had been waiting outside the pharmacy. Dilaudid is an analgesic narcotic with an addiction liability similar to that of morphine. Dilaudid is approximately 8 times more potent on a milligram basis than morphine and is often called "drug store heroin" on the streets. After noticing the drug's name on the prescription was spelled wrong, the pharmacist called the doctor and confirmed the prescription was bad, who thereafter called the police. When questioned by police, the defendant gave inconsistent statements and acknowledged that he was on the verge of a relapse to explain his actions, hired Attorney Topazio to defend him. Attorney Topazio's primary concern was to avoid a conviction, (which would protect his client's record) and at the same time insuring that his client did not lose his job due to a felony conviction. Attorney Topazio obtained his client's medical records to substantiate his client's course of treatment and prescription medications for court and in the process learned that his client became addicted to prescription medications following a medical procedure several years ago. Attorney Topazio recreated a chronology for the court including the factors which caused his client to lose tract of his own recovery, and presented same to the District Attorney in an attempt to resolve the matter. Today, Attorney Topazio convinced the court, over the District Attorney's objection, to give his client an administrative CWOF (continuance without a finding) for six months and thus avoided trial and consequences of a possible conviction. Administrative probation relieves the probationer of the reporting obligations associated with supervised probation.

The defendant was on probation for allegedly striking his son in the face with his belt, causing one of his teeth to be knocked out, hired Attorney Topazio when he received a Notice of Probation Violation and Hearing after testing positive for cocaine and alcohol, and for being arrested for disorderly conduct. On a prior date (see entry for September 17, 2009) Attorney Topazio caused the disorderly charge to be dismissed but still had to deal with his client's positive urine screens to avoid a violation of probation. Attorney Topazio met with the supervising probation officer and argued that the sentencing judge did not require that his client abstain from alcohol, but rather ordered that his client not engage in excessive drinking, which would not be a violation of his client's probation. Attorney Topazio scheduled his client's case before the sentencing judge for a clarification of the probation conditions and today, convinced the judge to vacate the testing requirement altogether. As a result, the Notice of Probation violation was withdrawn.

The defendant was arrested after Massachusetts State Police executed a search warrant for his home which alleged, among other things, that the police received information from a confidential informant that the defendant was selling Cocaine from his home. During the execution of the warrant, the police found a large sum of money, cocaine, a firearm and ammunition. The defendant, who was facing mandatory jail time, hired Attorney Topazio to defend him. Attorney Topazio filed a Motion to Suppress along with a Memorandum of Law attacking the legality of the search warrant, knowing that if the search was unconstitutional, then the evidence would be excluded and the Commonwealth would have no case. Attorney Topazio argued that where information from a confidential informant is relied upon to supply probable cause to obtain a search warrant, Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights requires that the affidavit apprise the magistrate (who decides whether to issue the search warrant) of sufficient facts and circumstances to establish both: "(1) the basis of the informant's knowledge, and (2) the credibility of the informant or the reliability of his information. Commonwealth v. O'Day, 440 Mass. 296, 301 (2003); Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363 (1985); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). In Massachusetts, the first prong, or the "basis of knowledge test," may be satisfied by evidence that "the informant had personally purchased drugs from the defendant." Such "direct knowledge" maybe inferred where the level of detail in the informant's tip regarding the identity of the seller and the drug-selling operation is "consistent with personal observation, not mere recitation of a casual rumor." The second prong, or the "veracity test," is commonly satisfied by reference in the affidavit to such factors as: the informant's successful track record of providing information to the police; the ability of the police to locate and contact the informant despite his/her anonymity in the affidavit; and the informant's recitation of "precise," "unique" and "predictive" detail. Today, Attorney Topazio convinced the District Attorney to place the trafficking charge on file, dismiss the school zone charge, and to accept a 2 year suspended sentence on the firearm's charge, and the Court agreed.

The defendant, a Boston Cab driver, received a citation for failing to stop and represented himself at the initial clerk's hearing, but was found responsible by a Clerk Magistrate, hired Attorney Topazio for his appeal before a Judge of the court. Today after argument, Attorney Topazio persuaded the Court that his client did not violate the law arguing that the officer's view of his client stopping would have been obstructed by a building based on the officer's viewpoint and what the officer in fact saw was his client's second attempt to enter the flow of traffic.

The alleged victim (who is related to the defendant but did not live with her) alleged that the defendant and her fiancé came to his home and broke in and maliciously damaged his property, filed a complaint in Superior Court requesting a restraining order issue against the defendant. The defendant hired Attorney Topazio to represent her at the hearing for the permanent restraining order. In Massachusetts, most restraining orders sought for protection are governed by Massachusetts General Laws chapter 209A. Under G.L. c. 209A a "family or household member" who claims to have suffered abuse can apply to the appropriate District Court for a restraining order to protect her against the actions of an alleged abuser. If the alleged victim, as in this case, is neither a family member nor household member of the alleged abuser, the alleged victim must apply to the Superior Court for injunctive relief. Today after hearing Attorney Topazio persuaded the court not to issue the restraining order for one year as requested but rather to extend it two months so as to give the parties the opportunity to see if matters could cool down before the Christmas holiday, with the intent of dismissing that order, and the court agreed.

The wife of the defendant recently filed for divorce and served the defendant with divorce papers, yet still lived with her husband. Prior to a hearing on temporary motions in the divorce case, the wife went to the Quincy District Court and obtained an ex parte temporary restraining order against her husband of 24 years. Ex parte means the wife appeared in court without giving notice to her husband when she obtained the temporary order. Prior to the hearing on the Permanent Order, the defendant hired Attorney Topazio. Today, after conducting a full hearing, Attorney Topazio, was successful through effective cross-examination in challenging the wife's credibility and convinced the Court that the actions of the wife to file for a restraining order were most probably motivated by a desire to get leverage in the recently filed divorce case and not because she was in fear of her safety. Through cross examination Attorney Topazio elicited testimony that there was no history of abuse, prior restraining orders or police intervention between the parties. Today Attorney Topazio persuaded the Court not to issue the permanent 209A Order.

The defendant, an active member of the United States Marine Corps, who recently returned from a tour of duty in Iraq, received a citation for speeding. The citation indicated that the defendant was allegedly caught on Lidar traveling 98 mph in a 65 mph zone. The client hired Attorney Topazio. Today after a Clerk's hearing, Attorney Topazio convinced a Clerk Magistrate to find his client not responsible.